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Engaging Expert Contractors: The Work Health and 
Safety Obligations of the Business or Undertaking 
 
Richard Johnstone* 
 
Abstract 
 
This article examines the legal principles governing the statutory work health and safety 
general duties of principals who engage expert contractors to carry out work beyond the 
expertise of the principal. The article examines recent case law in which superior courts 
accepted the principal’s argument that the engagement of the expert contractor was 
sufficient to discharge the principal’s statutory work health and safety general duty. It 
then reframes the debate within the principles of systematic work health and safety 
management, and key provisions in the harmonised Work Health and Safety Acts - the 
primary duty of care; the key underpinning principles; the positive and proactive officer’s 
duty; and the horizontal duty of consultation, co-operation and co-ordination. It argues 
that it is likely that courts examining the issue of the principal’s work health and safety 
obligations under the harmonised Work Health and Safety Acts will require principals to 
do more to actively manage the work of expert contractors to ensure the health and 
safety of all workers and others potentially affected by the work. 
 
Introduction 
 
The courts have made it clear that an employer’s statutory general duties under work 
health and safety (WHS) legislation are non-delegable.1 In 2012, however, the High Court 
in Baiada Poultry Pty Ltd v The Queen2 (Baiada) considered an argument that an employer 
could discharge its duty of care under the Occupational Health and Safety Act 2004 (Vic) 
(OHSA(Vic)) by relying on the expertise of independent contractors it had engaged. 
While this case was decided largely on a procedural point, in passing the High Court 
accepted that where an employer did not have the expertise required to carry out a work 
activity it was, at least in some circumstances, not reasonably practicable to discharge its 
duty of care by doing anything more than engaging an expert independent contractor to 
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carry out the work. This reasoning is consistent with a series of Western Australian 
Supreme Court decisions interpreting the provisions of the Occupational Safety and 
Health Act 1984 (WA) (OSHA(WA)). The first part of this article critically analyses the 
High Court and Western Australian decisions, in the context of case law declaring that 
the employer’s duty is non-delegable.  
 
The second half of the paper reframes these issues within preventive WHS principles. It 
argues that in the cases analysed the courts lose sight of the preventive, proactive nature 
of Australian WHS law which aims to constitute arrangements for self-regulation in 
organisations so that they will act responsibly and comply with their obligations as an 
ongoing state of affairs.3 Such an approach requires systematic management of WHS. 
Instead, because the cases analysed arise from prosecution proceedings that examine 
‘incidents’ ex post, they  replicate the thinking found in common law negligence cases 
where the inquiry is on who is responsible for an incident that has taken place. From 
2012-13, the issue has become more complex with the enactment in all Australian 
jurisdictions — apart from Victoria and Western Australia — of Work Health and Safety 
Acts (WHS Acts) that adopt the Model Work Health and Safety Bill (Model Bill), 
accepted by the Workplace Relations Ministers Council in 2009. The WHS Acts impose a 
primary general duty upon a ‘person who conducts a business or undertaking’ (PCBU) 
rather than upon an ‘employer’, and the duty is owed to ‘workers’ engaged, or caused to 
be engaged by the PCBU; and to workers whose work activities are influenced or 
directed by the PCBU. A ‘worker’ is defined in s 7 as a person who ‘carries out work in 
any capacity’ for a PCBU. The WHS Acts make it clear that the general duties are not 
transferable or delegable. Further s 46 of the WHS Acts provides that ‘if more than one 
person has the same duty concurrently under this Act, each person with the duty must, 
so far as is reasonably practicable, consult, co-operate and co-ordinate activities with all 
other persons who have a duty in relation to the same matter.’ 
 
The second half of this paper also considers whether these, and other, features of the 
WHS Acts affect whether a PCBU can rely on the expertise of independent contractors 
and others in order to discharge its primary duty of care.  
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Federation Press, Sydney, 2006, 483-502.   
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How an Employer May Discharge Its General Duty by 
Engaging an Expert Contractor 
 
The cases 
 
An employer may require the services of an independent contractor to perform work 
requiring expertise that the employer does not have, and cannot be expected to have. For 
example, if a firm decides to build a new building, or to install complex new plant, the 
firm cannot be expected to train its own employees to carry out all of the required tasks, 
nor to employ expert employees to do and supervise the work, particularly if the building 
or installation is a ‘one off’ activity. In these circumstances, it is reasonable for the firm 
to engage expert independent contractors to ensure that the work is done to a high 
standard. Indeed, it might be foolish to carry out the work without engaging external 
expertise, because failure to engage expertise might expose the firm’s employees and 
others to high levels of risk. The crucial point is that while the firm may devolve tasks to 
ensure the efficient and safe performance of work, it cannot absolve itself of 
responsibility for its WHS obligations.4  Lord Hoffman in the UK House of Lords 
decision R v Associated Octel Co Ltd 5 (Octel) put it very well when he stated that it is self-
evident ‘that a person conducting his own undertaking is free to decide how he will do 
so’ but must6  
do so in a way which, subject to reasonable practicability, does not create risks to people’s 
health and safety. If, therefore, the person engages an independent contractor to do work 
which forms part of the conduct of the person’s undertaking, he must stipulate for 
whatever conditions are needed to avoid those risks and are reasonably practicable. He 
cannot, having omitted to do so, say that he was not in a position to exercise any control. 
 
Lord Hoffman went on to state that the firm must protect its employees and others ‘not 
merely from the physical state of the premises … but also from the inadequacy of the 
arrangements which the [firm] makes with the contractors for how they will do the 
work.’7 The firm must ensure that the principal contractor is properly selected, and needs 
to manage the principal contractor, as far as is reasonably practicable, via the contract, 
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instruments showing how compliance should occur, and supervision and monitoring, to 
ensure compliance with the firm’s WHS obligations.  
 
As this discussion suggests, the firm’s relative lack of expertise to carry out the task 
outsourced to a contractor is relevant not only to (i) its ability to carry out the work 
activity to the requisite standard, but also to (ii) its ability to ensure, so far as is 
reasonably practicable, the WHS of all persons involved in or affected by the activity. As 
the Octel case suggests, if the firm outsources work to experts, it still has to ensure, as far 
as is reasonably practicable, the WHS of workers and all persons affected by the work 
activities. The firm may well be challenged to understand the nature of the work and the 
hazards involved, which will make ensuring WHS a difficult task. This article explores 
the firm’s responsibilities for WHS in these difficult circumstances. 
 
In the past seven years five key decisions have been handed down by the High Court and 
the Supreme Court of Western Australia on the extent of the employer’s statutory 
standard of care in circumstances where the employer engages an expert contractor to 
carry out work for which the employer lacks expertise. Ironically, these cases have 
involved the Victorian and Western Australian WHS statutes – the two statutes yet to be 
harmonised. The OHSA (Vic) requires an employer to, ‘so far as is reasonably 
practicable, provide and maintain for employees of the employer a working environment 
that is safe and without risks to health’. Section 19 of the OSHA(WA) provides that an 
‘employer shall, so far as is practicable, provide and maintain a working environment in 
which the employees of the employer … are not exposed to hazards’.  
 
The five cases have arisen from three scenarios, which illustrate the WHS issues when 
firms engage expert independent contractors. In each case the court accepted a firm’s 
argument that it had engaged a contractor to carry out particular activities because the 
contractor had expertise that the firm did not have, and that engaging the expert 
contractor was sufficient to discharge the firm’s statutory WHS general duty. 
 
The first two cases are the Western Australian Supreme Court, Court of Appeal decisions 
in Reilly v Devcon Australia Pty Ltd8 (Devcon) and Tobiassen v Reilly9 (Tobiassen) which arose 
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out of a single incident. Devcon Australia Pty Ltd (Devcon) engaged Kefo Steel Erection 
& Fabrication Pty Ltd (Kefo) to provide all necessary labour for the supervision and 
erection of structural steel and concrete tilted panels for a construction project. A 
company related to Devcon, Glenpoint Nominees Pty Ltd (Glenpoint), paid the invoices 
arising from the engagement of the labour and the materials. While Mr Kelsh (a rigger 
and the director of Kefo) and another employee of Kefo were installing purlins to 
rafters, the rafter upon which they were sitting and which had not been adequately 
secured, moved and fell, causing other rafters and panels to fall on and fatally injure Mr 
Kelsh. Devcon and Glenpoint were prosecuted for breaching s 19 of the OSHA (WA), 
allegedly because they both failed to ensure adequate lateral constraint of the steel roof 
beams.10 Section 19(4)11 of the OSHA (WA) deems independent contractors to be 
employees in some circumstances for the purposes of the employer’s duty to employees.  
 
Tobiassen was appointed by Devcon as a registered builder.12 The contract specified that 
Tobiassen was ‘engaged to actively manage, schedule and supervise the building work’ to 
ensure all tradespeople carried out their work in sequence, and to control the quality of 
materials and workmanship. Tobiassen expressly undertook that the building work would 
be completed in accordance with the plans and specifications. He was prosecuted under 
the self-employed person’s duty in s 21 of the OSHA (WA), the duty on a person 
constructing a building (s 23)(3)(a)), and the duty on a person in control of a workplace (s 
22), amongst other provisions. A common element of these three charges was the 
allegation that Tobiassen could have taken practicable measures to prevent the collapse 
of the rafters and the concrete panels. 
In the proceedings against Devcon, Murray J in the Supreme Court agreed with the 
Magistrate’s decision at first instance to reject the prosecution’s argument that Mr Kelsh 
was a deemed employee of Devcon’s under s 19(4) of the OSHA(WA) – thus neither 
Devcon nor Glenpoint were the employer of Mr Kelsh. Murray J then considered 
whether, if he was wrong and Mr Kelsh was an employee of Devcon, Devcon had 
contravened the employer’s duty in s 19. Murray J held that Devcon was entitled to ‘do 
                                                 
10  Note that it may not have helped the prosecution that the alleged offence was framed in terms 
of the physical work environment rather than the failure to provide and maintain systems of 
work that did not expose employees to hazards. 
11 Repealed in 2005 and replaced with a similar provision in s 24D. 
12 As required by the Builders’ Registration Act 1939 (WA).   
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no more than rely on the known expertise of Kefo’13 to discharge the s 19 duty imposed 
upon Devcon to do what was reasonably practicable to eliminate the hazard. The Court 
of Appeal in Devcon subsequently upheld Murray J’s decision. 
In the proceedings against Tobiassen, the Court of Appeal overruled Heenan J in the 
Supreme Court, and upheld the Magistrate’s decision that Tobiassen was an employee of 
Devcon; that the work undertaken by Kefo was not work in which Tobiassen was 
engaged; that Tobiassen was not a person constructing a building; and that Tobiassen did 
not have control of the workplace. Crucially, the Court of Appeal followed its decision in 
Devcon, restating that an employer was entitled to do no more than rely on the expertise 
of the independent contractor to discharge the duty to do what was reasonably 
practicable.  
 
Two other cases, Laing O’Rourke (BMC) Pty Ltd v Kirwin14 (Laing O’Rourke) and Kirwin v 
The Pilbara Infrastructure Pty Ltd15 (Pilbara Infrastructure), also arose out of a single incident. 
In March 2007 Cyclone George hit a camp site in a cyclonic wind region in the Pilbara, at 
which prefabricated huts (dongas) had been constructed. Several dongas were detached, 
damaged or completely destroyed, causing two deaths and multiple cases of serious injury 
to employees and a contractor. There was expert evidence that the dongas would have 
provided sufficient protection if they had been correctly tied down and installed 
according to safety standards.  
 
Laing O’Rourke was engaged by the Pilbara Infrastructure Pty Ltd (TPI) (a wholly 
owned subsidiary of Fortescue Metals Group Limited (FMG)) to carry out track and 
bridge work in the construction of a railway line. TPI engaged Spotless Services Australia 
Ltd to conduct a tender for the installation of the dongas to accommodate workers on 
the project, including Laing O’Rourke workers. The tender document had erroneously 
stated that the site was located within a non-cyclonic wind region. Spotless Services 
withdrew from conducting the tender, after which TPI directly engaged NT Link for the 
installation of the dongas. NT Link represented that it had significant expertise and 
experience in the supply and installation of transportable buildings in cyclonic regions, 
and the magistrate ‘expressed the view that TPI and FMG had procured the services of 
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[49]). 
14 [2011] WASCA 117. 
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apparently well qualified and experienced experts to design and identify the suitable 
specifications for the buildings’.16 FMG contracted with an engineering firm, Worley 
Parsons Services Pty Ltd, for engineering, procurement, construction and management 
services for the project. FMG and Worley Parsons formed a management group to 
coordinate the management of the project. FMG, through Worley Parsons, engaged 
Lawry, an engineer with considerable experience, to supervise, inspect and assess the 
quality of the installation work. NT Link applied for and was granted a building licence 
by the Shire of East Pilbara, which did not pick up the mistake in the wind region 
specification.  
 
TPI, FMG and Laing O'Rourke, were each prosecuted for contraventions of the 
OSHA(WA). TPI faced 12 charges under s 19(1) for failing to provide and maintain 
adequate safety procedures in the event of a cyclone and for failing to provide a safe 
refuge in the event of a cyclone; and five charges for failing to maintain premises 
occupied by employees able to withstand cyclones.17 In the same proceedings, FMG 
faced one charge under s 19(1) for failing to provide and maintain adequate safety 
procedures in the event of a cyclone. The prosecutor argued that TPI and FMG failed to 
ensure that the dongas were built according to relevant load specifications by engaging 
the services of an appropriately qualified engineer specifically to ensure that this had been 
done.  
 
Laing O’Rourke had not in any way been associated with the construction of the dongas, 
but in separate proceedings it was prosecuted with two charges under s 19(1),18 each 
charge alleging that the dongas had not been constructed to meet the appropriate wind 
load standards. In Laing O’Rourke, the prosecutor argued successfully before the Western 
Australian Supreme Court (on appeal against a decision by a Magistrate not to convict 
Laing O’Rourke) that the employer’s general duty required Laing O’Rourke to enquire 
and investigate for itself, including by taking engineering advice if necessary, whether the 
dongas had been properly designed and built to withstand the effect of the kind of 
cyclone that eventuated in March 2007.  
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 Ibid at [85]. 
17 Ss 23G and H of the OSHA(WA). 
18 And, inter alia, s 23D, which deems contractors and their employees and sub-contractors in 
some circumstances to be employees of the engaging employer. 
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The Court of Appeal in the appeal in Laing O’Rourke, and Hall J in the Supreme Court in 
Pilbara Infrastructure (in dismissing an appeal against the Magistrate’s decision not to 
convict), respectively applied the same principles, including the Devcon decision, to the 
use of contractors. They held that whilst Laing O’Rourke, TPI and FMG could not 
contract out of their duties, they could perform those duties by ensuring that 
appropriately experienced and qualified experts were retained to deal with matters 
beyond their competence and expertise, provided the task reasonably appeared to have 
been carefully and safely performed by the contractor. 
 
In the fifth case, Baiada,19 the company, Baiada Poultry Pty Ltd (Baiada), conducted a 
business of processing chickens. Baiada engaged the independent contractor DMP 
Poultech P/L (DMP) to round up chickens, load them into crates, stack the crates into a 
series of steel modules, and load modules onto a trailer using a forklift truck. Baiada also 
engaged another independent contractor, Azzopardi Haulage Pty Ltd (Azzopardi), to 
drive the trailer to Baiada’s processing plant. An employee of DMP, who was not 
licensed to drive a forklift, without supervision used a forklift to move a module on a 
trailer, which resulted in another module falling and fatally injuring an employee of 
Azzopardi. Baiada was prosecuted for a contravention of the employer’s general duty in s 
21(1) of the OHSA(Vic) (together with s 21(3), which deems independent contractors to 
be employees in some circumstances for the purposes of the employer’s general duty.)  
 
WorkSafe Victoria alleged that Baiada should have, but had not: 
o provided an adequate system of work that was to be followed at grower farms or 
broiler sheds; 
o ensured that the forklift was operated by a properly trained employee; and 
o identified and eliminated or controlled the risks associated with the system of 
unloading and loading live birds for transport at night. 
 
Baiada argued that to discharge its WHS obligations it was ‘entitled’ to ‘rely on’ 
competent and experienced sub-contractors to carry out work that Baiada could not do 
itself, because Baiada did not have control over the use and operation of the forklift, and 
‘a practicable method’ for Baiada to perform its s 21 duty was to rely on sub-contractors. 
The High Court seemed to accept, in principle, that Baiada could, in some circumstances, 
rely on its expert contractors, but its decision turned on a procedural issue. The High 
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Court found that it was not open to the Court of Appeal to conclude from the record of 
the trial that the charge laid against Baiada was proved beyond reasonable doubt, and the 
Court of Appeal could not be satisfied that no substantial miscarriage of justice had 
actually occurred. The High Court ordered a retrial.20  
 
In conclusion, in each of the cases discussed in this section, a firm argued that it had 
engaged a contractor to carry out particular activities to provide expertise that the firm 
did not have; and then argued that the engagement of the expert contractor was 
sufficient to discharge the firm’s statutory WHS general duty. In each of these cases, the 
court accepted this argument.  
 
Back to first principles: How is the absolute duty to be discharged? 
 
Can these decisions be reconciled with the generally accepted principles that the 
employer’s duty is non-delegable, that the employer is personally, not vicariously, liable 
under its duty to employees and non-employees,21 and that duty holders cannot contract 
out of their statutory WHS obligations?22 While a corporate employer can only conduct 
its activities through human agents, such as its directors, managers, supervisors, 
employees and contractors,23 in principle, an employer cannot argue that it has 
discharged its duty by relying on the activities of its employees, officers and agents, and it 
cannot exculpate itself by showing that ‘it did all it could’, and that the responsibility lay 
with the omissions or inadequate actions of an officer, employee, independent 
contractor, or other agent of the corporation. In Kirk v Industrial Relations Commission of 
NSW24 the majority of the High Court summed up the position as follows: 
The obligation upon the employer is expressed in terms personal to that employer. It is the employer 
who must ensure the health, safety and welfare of employees at work. The obligation is the kind of 
non-delegable duty spoken of in Kondis v State Transport Authority. 
The courts have now made it clear that the so-called ‘Tesco principle’ does not apply to 
the duties under the WHS statutes.25 In Tesco Supermarkets Ltd v Nattrass26 (Tesco) the House 
                                                 
20
 For a critique of Baiada, see K Wheelright, ‘Baida Poultry: Employers, Independent 
Contractors and Reasonable Practicability in Workplace Safety’ (2012) 18 Employment Law 
Bulletin 35. 
21 See, for example, Octel, above n 5, and the cases to be discussed in this section.  
22 See Inspector Melissa Chaston v Sacco Builders Pty Ltd [2008] NSWIRComm 152, at [37]. 
23 TTS Pty Ltd v Griffiths (1991) 105 FLR 255. 
24 (2010) 239 CLR 531 at [10]. 
25 For an early case in which the Tesco principle was applied to Australian work health and safety 
legislation, see Collins v State Rail Authority of New South Wales (1986) 5 NSWLR 209. 
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of Lords decided that to comply with provisions in the Trade Descriptions Act 1968 
(UK) Tesco Supermarkets Ltd could appoint someone within the corporation to 
discharge the duties imposed by the Act as long as the company took all reasonable 
precautions and exercised all due diligence to satisfy the statutory defence set out in the 
Act. The case is also authority for the principle that where an offence requires evidence 
of the mens rea of a corporation, there must be an act or omission performed by someone 
with the authority to act as the corporation – the board of directors, the managing 
director or a person to whom a function of the board has been delegated. 
In R v British Steel plc27 (British Steel) the UK Court of Appeal held that the Tesco principle 
did not apply to WHS offences. It held that an employer defending a general duty 
prosecution under s 3(1) of the Health and Safety at Work etc Act 1974 (UK) could not 
argue that the company at the level of its directing mind had taken all reasonable care, 
and that the fatality had occurred because the worker had disobeyed instructions, and/or 
the incident resulted from the fault of a supervisor because, according to Steyn LJ, this 
interpretation ‘would drive a juggernaut through the legislative scheme’ and ‘would 
emasculate the legislation.28 
In a very influential commentary on British Steel,29 Professor Sir John Smith explained the 
position as follows: 
Where a statutory duty to do something is imposed on a particular person (here, an ‘employer’) 
and he does not do it, he commits the actus reus of an offence. It may be that he has failed to 
fulfil his duty because his employee or agent has failed to carry out his duties properly but this 
is not a case of vicarious liability. If the employer is held liable, it is because he, personally, has 
failed to do what the law requires him to do and he is personally, not vicariously, liable. There is 
no need to find someone – in the case of a company, the ‘brains’ and not merely the ‘hands’ – for whose acts the 
person with the duty can be held liable. The duty on the company in this case was ‘to ensure’ – ie. to make 
certain – that persons are not exposed to risk. They did not make certain. It does not matter how; they were 
in breach of their statutory duty and, in the absence of any requirement of mens rea, that is the 
end of the matter.30 
                                                                                                                                            
26 [1972] AC 153. 
27 [1995] 1 WLR 1356, 
28 British Steel, above n 27, at 1362-3. 
29 Smith, J, ‘Health and Safety at Work’ [1995] Crim LR 654, 655. This passage was endorsed in R 
v Gateway Foodmarkets Ltd [1997] 3 All ER 78 (Gateway Foodmarkets); R v Nelson Group Services Ltd 
(Maintenance) [1998] 4 All ER 331 (CA) (Nelson); Attorney-General’s Reference (No.2 of 1999) [2000] 
QB 796 at 812; Linework Ltd v Department of Labour [2001] 2 NZLR 639 (Linework); R v 
Commercial Industrial Construction Group Pty Ltd [2006] VSCA 181 (CICG) at [25] and ABC 
Developmental Learning Centres Pty Ltd v Wallace [2007] VSCA 138 at [12]-[17]. 
30 Emphasis added. 
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This approach was adopted, and the Australian position clarified,31 by the Supreme Court 
of Victoria, Court of Appeal in CICG,32 in the context of sentencing an employer 
convicted of an offence against s 21 of the Occupational Health and Safety Act 1985 (Vic). In 
its submission in mitigation of penalty, Commercial Industrial Construction Group 
(CICG) accepted that the ‘failures’ of its site manager ‘are the failures of the company’33 
‘no matter how unfair some might think that is’. CICG sought some mitigation in penalty 
because of the ‘unfairness’ of this attribution, and for not raising what, it claimed, might 
be a ‘healthy debate as to whether [the supervisor] was or was not the company’. The 
Court of Appeal was quick to point out34 that ‘these submissions all proceed from a false 
premise. No question of attribution arose – or could have arisen – in this proceeding.’   
The Court of Appeal confirmed that the Tesco attribution principle did not apply to the 
Australian WHS legislation. The Court of Appeal stated that: 
24 The legislative regime for workplace safety is quite different from that which was in issue 
in Tesco. Breach of s.21(1) of the 1985 Act did not depend on proof of mens rea. … 
Notwithstanding the [reasonable] practicability qualification, the liability is properly to be 
regarded as absolute, since there is no room for a defence of honest and reasonable mistake. 
Unlike the position in Tesco, there is no ‘due diligence’ defence, nor is it a defence to show 
that the breach was ‘due to the act or default of another person’. 
It then affirmed the view in British Steel that a worker will only be exposed to risk if the 
WHS system has broken down, and that it is immaterial ‘at what level in the hierarchy of 
employees that breakdown has taken place.’35 
The Victorian Court of Appeal in CICG also endorsed a slightly different approach to get 
to the same result.36 Following Lord Hoffman in Meridian Global Funds Management Asia 
Limited v Securities Commission,37 it accepted that the question of whether the application of 
a statutory provision to a company involves rules of attribution − and, if so, what form 
those rules should take − is a question of construction of the relevant statute. It 
concluded that ‘on the proper construction’ of the employer’s general duty ‘no rules of 
attribution are called for’, 38 and that ‘the only question is whether the employer company 
                                                 
31
 CICG, above n 29, at [25]. 
32 CICG, above n 29. 
33 Ibid at [20]. 
34 Ibid at [22]. 
35 Ibid [25]. See also Gateway Foodmarkets , above n 29; and see also Linework, above n 29 , per 
Tipping J, at 649-50. 
36 This approach was taken by the majority in the New Zealand Court of Appeal in Linework, 
above n 29. 
37 [1995] 2 AC 500, especially 506-7 and 511. 
38  CICG, above n 29, at [30]. 
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has done everything that it was (reasonably) practicable to do to ensure the safety of its 
employees.’39 
The Victorian Court of Appeal concluded40 that a court in a WHS prosecution must 
decide – by examining the evidence of the supervisor’s and employees’ acts or omissions, 
and the resultant serious risks to which employees were exposed – whether the company 
has done everything reasonably practicable to ensure the WHS of employees. If a 
reasonably practicable measure was not taken, then the company has failed to discharge 
its general duty of care – regardless of whether the failure was due to the act or omission 
of a senior officer, a branch officer, manager or by a junior employee. 
 
I conclude this section by noting that it is well accepted that an employer must discharge 
its duty irrespective of a duty imposed on other parties, for example a contractor or an 
employee, in the same situation. In particular, the courts have consistently stated that 
employers cannot attempt to exculpate themselves from liability for contraventions of 
the general duty provisions by arguing that the contravention was due to the 
inadvertence, negligence or disobedience of employees, including the injured employee.41   
 
Can an employer ‘rely on’ the appointment of expert independent 
contractors to discharge the employer’s general duty? 
The discussion in the previous section suggests that, at first blush, the employer’s general 
duty is non-delegable, and that the employer is personally responsible for providing and 
maintaining a safe system of work in order to discharge its general duty obligations, and 
for the failures of employees and agents to carry out the safe system of work established 
by the employer. The key issue, however, is whether the company has done everything 
reasonably practicable to ensure the WHS of its employees or others. Where the 
employer does not have the expertise to carry out an activity, the safest approach may be 
to employ new employees, or engage independent contractors, with the requisite 
expertise. If the former approach is taken, the only issue would be whether it was 
reasonably practicable for the employer to establish a safe system of work for the activity 
                                                 
39  CICG, above n 29, at [30]. 
40  CICG, above n 29, at [23]. 
41    See, for example, R v Australian Char Pty Ltd (1996) 64 IR 387; Holmes v RE Spence & Co Pty 
Ltd (1993) 5 VIR 119; Tenix Defence Pty Ltd v Maccarone [2003] WASCA 165, at [45]; Ferraloro v 
Preston Timber Ltd (1982) 42 ALR 627; Rail Infrastructure Corporation v Inspector Page [2008] 
NSWIRComm 169.  See further Tooma, M, Tooma’s Annotated Occupational Health and Safety 
Act 2000 (NSW), Thomson Reuters, 2009 at 49-50.  
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in question, and to supervise the expert employee and ensure that the expert employee 
followed the employer’s safe system of work.42  
 
The decisions in Baiada, Laing O’Rourke, Pilbara Infrastructure, Devcon and Tobiassen, 
discussed above, would appear to take a different approach when the employer engages 
contractors with expertise or experience that the employer lacks. These cases suggest that 
while WHS responsibilities cannot be delegated, they can be allocated, and may be 
influenced by the notion that where contractors are engaged they are ‘external’ to the 
engaging company, rather than ‘internal’ as is the case of the employees in the CICG and 
Linework decisions. Complex issues arise, however, when expert contractors are engaged. 
For example, in the Victorian Supreme Court, Court of Appeal in the Baiada litigation 
Nettle JA examined the two key lines of cases in Devcon43and the Court of Appeal of 
England and Wales decision in R v Associated Octel Co Ltd,44 which were followed in R v 
ACR Roofing Pty Ltd,45 and considered that they had set out common principles: 
Both recognize that, in the scheme of things, an employer does not ordinarily have control over 
the way in which a competent or expert contractor does the work which the contractor is engaged 
to perform. Equally, both allow that there are cases where an independent contractor is 
susceptible to direction in some respects. Additionally, Associated Octel is clear, and Reilly v Devcon 
does not gainsay, that a contractor may be susceptible to direction regarding the safety measures 
to be observed while work is performed. Whether it is reasonably practicable for an employer to 
exercise such a power of direction is then a question of fact and degree.46 
 
This part of the article examines the way in which the decisions in Baiada, Laing O’Rourke, 
Pilbara Infrastructure, Devcon and Tobiassen address these complex issues and summarises 
the legal principles emerging from these cases.  
 
(a) The issue of the expertise of independent contractors is part of the 
‘reasonably practicable’ calculus 
 
The High Court in Baiada confirmed that the prosecution must prove beyond reasonable 
doubt that the principal’s engagement of the expert contractor(s) was not sufficient to 
                                                 
42    See Nelson, above n 29. See also Gateway Foodmarkets Ltd, above n 29, at 84 
43 Devcon, above n 7, at [34]–[35]. 
44 [1994] 4 All ER 1051 at 1063. 
45  (2004) 11 VR 187 at 213. 
46  Nettle JA in Baiada Poultry Pty Ltd v The Queen [2011] VSCA 23 (18 February 2011) (Baiada 
Poultry Pty Ltd) at [19]. 
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discharge the principal’s duty to do all that was reasonably practicable to provide and 
maintain a safe work environment.47 The majority of the High Court stated48 that: 
The words “reasonably practicable” indicate that the duty does not require an employer to 
take every possible step that could be taken. The steps that are to be taken in performance of 
the duty are those that are reasonably practicable for the employer to take to achieve the 
identified end of providing and maintaining a safe working environment. Bare demonstration 
that a step could have been taken and that, if taken, it might have had some effect on the 
safety of a working environment does not, without more, demonstrate that an employer has 
broken the duty. 
 
The High Court stated that the court did not just have to consider what steps Baiada 
could have taken to secure compliance but  
also whether Baiada's obligation “so far as is reasonably practicable” to provide and maintain 
a safe working environment obliged it: (a) to give safety instructions to its (apparently skilled 
and experienced) subcontractors; (b) to check whether its instructions were followed; (c) to 
take some steps to require compliance with its instructions; or (d) to do some combination 
of these things or even something altogether different. 49 
 
More specifically, the majority of the High Court50 queried the the majority of the 
Victorian Supreme Court, Court of Appeal’s finding about the reasonable practicability 
of the measures that Baiada could have taken to address the hazard. The majority of the 
Court of Appeal had held that there had not been a substantial miscarriage of justice due 
to the trial judge’s failure to instruct the jury that the prosecution must prove beyond 
reasonable doubt that the principal’s engagement of the expert contractor(s) was not 
sufficient to discharge the principal’s duty to do all that was reasonably practicable to 
provide and maintain a safe work environment.51 It concluded that‘[i]t was entirely 
practicable for [Baiada] to [direct] the contractors to put loading and unloading safety 
measures in place and to check whether those safety measures were being observed from 
time to time’, and pointed to four considerations that supported this conclusion:  
1.  neither DMP nor Azzopardi had specialist expertise in loading or unloading that 
Baiada lacked;  
2. the risk of death or injury when a forklift was being used and the need to take 
precautions were obvious; 
3. the necessary precautions were commonsense measures well known to Baiada 
and throughout the industry; and 
                                                 
47 Baiada above n 2, particularly at [1]. See also Hall J in Pilbara Infrastructure , above n 15, at [75]. 
48 Baiada above n 1 at [15]. 
49 Ibid at [33]. 
50 Ibid  at [37]. 
51 S 568(1) Crimes Act 1958. 
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4. the cost of issuing safety instructions was minimal compared with the gravity of 
the risk of harm.52  
 
 The High Court doubted that the first of these considerations bore upon whether it was 
practicable for Baiada to give instructions to its subcontractors or to check whether its 
instructions were being observed. It also noted that no consideration was given to how 
or at what cost the process of ‘checking’ compliance with safety instructions could or 
would be undertaken or to the likelihood of the risk eventuating. The High Court 
reasoned that the four considerations listed by the majority of the Court of Appeal did 
not require the conclusion that not taking the identified steps was a breach of Baiada’s 
duty:53 the evidence permitted the jury to conclude beyond reasonable doubt that it was 
reasonably practicable for Baiada to take steps to ensure compliance with instructions of 
that kind, but did not compel that conclusion. 54  Thus the High Court held that it was not 
open to the Court of Appeal to conclude from the record of the trial that the charge was 
proved beyond reasonable doubt.  
 
In conclusion, the issue of the expertise of contractors is to be considered as one of the 
considerations in the ‘reasonable practicable’ calculus. However, as discussed in the next 
section, expertise of the contractor only becomes significant if it is expertise that the 
principal (the employer) is not expected to have. On this the courts have adopted an 
objective test in order to determine the type of knowledge to be expected of a principal. 
 
(b) ‘Reasonably practicable’ and the knowledge expected of the principal 
(the employer) 
 
As CICG noted, the general duties in the current Australian WHS statutes are all 
‘absolute’ duties, qualified by the expression ‘so far as is reasonably practicable’. While 
this would appear to be oxymoronic, it means that the prosecution does not need to 
establish that the duty holder knew that its act was wrongful, and that to discharge the 
absolute duty, the duty holder is only required to take ‘reasonably practicable’ measures. 
What is ‘reasonably practicable’ is defined in s 18 of the WHS Acts, s 20(2) of the OHSA 
(Vic), and s 3 of the OSHA (WA).  
                                                 
52 Baiada Poultry Pty Ltd, above n 46, at [63]. 
53  Baiada, above n 1 at [38]. 
54  Ibid at [36]. 
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The courts55 have interpreted the expression ‘so far as is reasonably practicable’ to 
impose an ‘objective’ test: what would a reasonable person in the position of the 
employer know about the hazard and risks, and how would they ‘weigh up’ the risks and 
the practicability and cost of eliminating, or reducing, them? A measure is only not 
reasonably practicable if there is a ‘gross disproportion’ between the two sides: that is, 
the ‘time, trouble and cost’ of removing the risk is ‘grossly disproportionate’ to the level 
of risk.  
 
The statutory definitions of ‘reasonably practicable’ have largely codified the judicial 
definition, but with subtle differences. For example, the OHSA (Vic), which applied in 
Baiada, defines ‘reasonably practicable’ as having regard to ‘the following matters’: 
 (a) the likelihood of the hazard or risk concerned eventuating;  
 (b) the degree of harm that would result if the hazard or risk eventuated;  
 (c) what the person concerned knows, or ought reasonably to know, about the hazard 
or risk and any ways of eliminating or reducing the hazard or risk;  
 (d) the availability and suitability of ways to eliminate or reduce the hazard or risk;  
 (e) the cost of eliminating or reducing the hazard or risk. 
 
Section 3 of the OSHA (WA) provides that in the general duties, ‘”practicable” means 
“reasonably practicable”’ and then defines ‘reasonably practicable’ in terms similar to s 
20(2) of the OHSA(Vic).  
While these statutory formula draw on the same ‘matters’ as are found in the judicial 
definition of ‘reasonably practicable’, the language is different. Notably, the definitions 
omit the ‘grossly disproportionate’ test and do not explicitly require the courts to ‘weigh 
up’ the factors. As Murray JA observed in Laing O'Rourke, the objective ‘state of 
knowledge’ of the risk and gravity of injury and the means of mitigating the risk ‘is that 
possessed by persons generally who are engaged in the relevant field of activity and not 
merely the actual knowledge in fact possessed by a specific employer in the particular 
circumstances.’56 
 
A crucial issue in the expert contractor cases introduced above is precisely what is the 
knowledge possessed by persons ‘generally engaged in the relevant field of activity’? Is it 
the best knowledge available within the industry as a whole; or is it what a person 
                                                 
55 See Edwards v National Coal Board [1949] 1 KB 704 at 712. 
56 Laing O’Rourke, above n 14, at [33]. 
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performing the same kind of work as the employer, principal or contractor ought to 
know? If, as argued by Heenan J in Reilly v Tobiassen,57  the former is the test, then the 
standard of care imposed upon the employer or principal is very high, and the employer 
or principal would have to gain the requisite knowledge by research or training, by 
employing an employee with expertise, or by seeking the advice of experts. If it is the 
latter, then it is arguable that an employer or principal is able to discharge its duty simply 
by engaging an expert independent contractor, without itself building up its knowledge 
base. This was the view preferred by the Western Australian Court of Appeal58 when it 
overruled Heenan J’s decision in Reilly v Tobiassen.  
 
At first instance in the prosecution of Tobiassen, the Magistrate ruled that ‘while a 
professional engineer would have known of the risks associated with a lack of lateral 
restraint and how to deal with them, those were not matters of which [Tobiassen] was 
aware and they were not matters of which a registered builder would reasonably have 
been expected to be aware.’59 Accordingly the Magistrate determined that it was not 
practicable for Tobiassen to have ensured the adequate lateral restraint of the rafters. 
 
Heenan J disagreed and held that the fact that the risks were not known to Tobiassen, 
and that they were not matters which a registered builder would be expected to know, 
was not to the point. Heenan J said that it was sufficient that ‘there is an objective state 
of knowledge within the industry which exposes the hazard and suggests a means of 
coping with it’.60 The general duties required persons on whom the duties were cast ‘to 
acquaint themselves with the objective state of knowledge within the industry and … to 
take advice from experts and others to supplement his or her own appreciation of the 
situation’. Heenan J noted61 that Dawson, Toohey and Gaudron JJ in Chugg v Pacific Dunlop 
Ltd62 observed that ‘in many instances the questions of practicability do not involve 
special knowledge’, but simply common sense. Heenan J justified his broad view as 
being: 
consistent with the policy of the Act which, in my view, is intended to achieve a situation 
that if, objectively speaking, there is known within an industry that there are hazards of a 
                                                 
57 [2008] WASC 6. 
58 Tobiassen, above n 9. 
59 Reilly v Tobiassen above n 57 at [21]. 
60 Ibid at [121]. 
61 Ibid at [118]. 
62 (1990) 170 CLR 249 at 260. 
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particular kind which may be injurious to the health and welfare of persons on worksites, 
and that there are means available of avoiding or reducing those hazards, then, having 
regard to factors such as the degree of risk, the means of removing or mitigating the risk 
and the availability, suitability and the cost of the means to reduce the risk, the decision 
about practicability will then be taken in a balanced and objective fashion.63 
 
Heenan J argued that his view was ‘entirely consistent with the legislative policy to bring 
work safety standards into compliance with objective safety criteria known to industry as 
a whole.’64 Heenan J reasoned that this standard was not too onerous because it meant 
simply that an employer, self-employed person or employee bearing a general duty under 
the Act: 
will be a person who is informed and cognisant of the objective standards of dealing with 
hazards existing within the industry in which he or she may be working, even though this 
may require that person to seek advice from experts or others better informed than himself 
or herself so as to become acquainted with that objective standard. 65 
Accordingly, Heenan J found that the fact that the relevant knowledge existed within the 
building industry was sufficient, even if it was confined to qualified engineers, and 
regardless of the fact that it would not be known to persons in the position of the 
appellant.66 
 
This reasoning seems compelling. The implication is that if a duty holder does not him/ 
herself have the relevant knowledge they will need to advice from experts or others who 
are well informed.  However, the Court of Appeal in Devcon, and then in the appeal 
against Heenan J’s decision in Tobiassen, took the contrary position, and held that neither 
Devcon or Tobiassen was required to inform themselves of the means necessary to ensure 
there was adequate lateral restraint of the steel beams erected by Kefo. 
In Devcon, the Court of Appeal dealt with the issue of the ‘state of knowledge’ on its way 
to holding that it was not reasonably practicable for Devcon to do more than rely on the 
expertise of the independent contractors. The Court of Appeal accepted that the ‘state of 
knowledge’ expected of Devcon was to be determined objectively, and stated that a 
crucial issue was ‘who might ordinarily be expected to have that knowledge’:67 ‘it would 
be a relevant consideration that the expert knowledge required to avoid the hazard fell 
                                                 
63  Reilly v Tobiassen above n 56 at [119]. See also [120]. 
64  Ibid at [123] 
65  Ibid at [123] 
66  Tobiassen above n 9 at [49]. 
67  At para 60. See Pilbara Infrastructure, above n 15, at [98]-[101]. 
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within the province of the specialist contractor which had been engaged to do the work 
that gave rise to the hazard and outside that of the … employer.’ The Court referred to 
the Western Australian Supreme Court case of Morrison v De Bono68 where Le Miere J said 
that to succeed in a conviction under the OSHA(WA) the prosecutor  'must prove either 
that the defendant actually knew of the risk of injury or harm to health occurring or that 
a reasonable person in the position of the defendant [our italics] would have appreciated or 
foreseen the risk ... of the injury or harm to health occurring’. 
In Tobiassen69 the Court of Appeal took a similar approach and concluded that the 
erection of concrete panels, the fixing of rafters, the particular hazard that led to the 
accident and the means of eliminating it were all matters falling outside the expertise of 
Tobiassen, but were matters that Tobiassen reasonably believed were within the expertise 
of the contractors. 
Of course, if the principal acquires knowledge about the issues, then this will affect the 
measures that will be reasonably practicable for them to take. For example, in Pilbara 
Infrastructure 70 Hall J stated that if a principal is alerted to a particular risk or issue by a 
specialist contractor then there may be further steps that it is reasonably practicable for 
them to take. 
(c) Acquiring expert knowledge or relying on experts to carry out the 
work? 
The Western Australian Court of Appeal in Devcon considered whether an employer 
lacking the requisite expertise to carry out an activity was required to acquire the 
expertise (as suggested by Heenan J in Reilley v Tobiassen), or whether the employer could 
fulfil its duty by engaging an expert independent contractor. It preferred the latter view, 
and endorsed ‘what was said by Steytler J in Hamersley Iron’71 about the employer’s general 
duty in s 9(1)(a) of the Mines Safety and Inspection Act 1994 (WA), which resembled the s 19 
duty in the OSHA(WA). According to the Court of Appeal in Devcon, in Hamersley Iron, 
Steytler J held that: 
if the obligation to provide a safe workplace requires an employer to call upon expertise that 
it lacks, then it should do so. However, he added that, if the employer had relied upon a 
                                                 
68  Morrison v De Bono (2005) 147 IR 454 at [22]. 
69  Above n 9. 
70  Above n 15 at [136]. 
71  Hamersley Iron Pty Ltd v Robertson (Unreported, WASC, Library No 980573, 2 October 1998). 
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specialist contractor to perform a task which demonstrably fell within its area of expertise 
and outside that of the employer, and if the task reasonably appears to the employer … to 
have been carefully and safely performed by the specialist contractor, it would ordinarily be 
difficult to conclude that the employer had breached the duty put upon it by the Act.72  
The Court of Appeal in Devcon agreed with this construction, arguing that a ‘construction 
imposing a greater burden on an employer of the kind there under consideration would be 
unreasonable and unsupported by the language of the section, read in its context’.73 The 
Court of Appeal did not accept the argument put by the prosecutor in Devcon that the 
court’s construction of the general duty and reasonably practicable, outlined above, would 
contravene the non-delegability principle because the employer sought to discharge the 
duty by relying on the person to whom the duty was owed.74  
Similarly, in Pilbara Infrastructure  Hall J argued that ‘an employer or principal faced with a 
task beyond its area of expertise’75 (or knowledge and ability)76 cannot ‘relieve itself of any 
responsibility’77 under the WHS legislation by contracting out or delegating their duties. 78 
His honour emphasised that the duty remained ‘a personal one’, 79 but that it could be 
discharged by ‘ensuring that relevant expertise is brought to bear on the task’80 and 
‘ensuring that an appropriately experienced and qualified person was retained to deal with 
matters beyond their own knowledge and ability’.81 ‘What is required in any particular case 
would depend upon the facts of the case’.  
Exactly what the courts require of an employer engaging an expert contractor is examined 
in the next section. 
(d) When can an employer discharge its duty by relying on expert 
independent contractors? 
 
It is clear from the previous discussion that:  
                                                 
72 Devcon above n 8, at [64] 
73  Ibid at [65]. 
74  Ibid at [69]. 
75  Pilbara Infrastructure , above n 14, at [102]. 
76 Ibid at [180]. 
77 Ibid at [102]. 
78 Ibid at [180]. 
79 Ibid at [102]. 
80 Ibid at [102]. 
81 Ibid at 180]. 
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In some circumstances the engagement of independent contractors may be the only 
reasonably practicable way of ensuring and maintaining a safe working environment.82  
What then are the circumstances in which the courts will find that the only reasonably 
practicable way to ensure a safe working environment is to engage an expert contractor? 
The most helpful principles are those articulated by Hall J in Pilbara Infrastructure:83 
… if the obligation to provide a safe work place requires an employer to call upon expertise 
that it lacks then it should do so. …[I]f an employer relied upon a specialist contractor to 
perform a task which demonstrably fell within the contractor's area of expertise and outside 
that of the employer, and if the task reasonably appears to the employer to have been 
carefully and safely performed by the contractor, it would ordinarily be difficult to conclude 
that the employer had breached the statutory duty. …[I]n circumstances of that kind it 
would not ordinarily be practicable for the employer to do more.84 
Further, 
It is unlikely to be enough for a person to merely assume that someone else will attend to 
safety requirements, but if such an assumption is based upon inquiries made, assurances 
given, a reasonable belief as to the skills of those responsible for construction and a 
reasonable belief that regulatory approval has been obtained for the buildings, it may be 
wellfounded.85 
The cases outlined in this first part of the article clearly show that the courts have 
decided that in some circumstances an employer can discharge its statutory general duty 
of care by engaging an expert independent contractor to carry out work for which the 
employer lacks expertise. In Baiada, the High Court accepted that it was for the 
prosecution to prove that the employer should have taken reasonably practicable 
measures beyond simply engaging the expert independent contractor in order to ensure 
the safest work environment.  
The second part of this article considers what an employer should do when it lacks the 
expertise to carry out a specialised task, but reframes the issues within the principles of 
systematic WHS management. 
 
Preventing Harm through Systematic Work Health and Safety 
Management 
                                                 
82  Heydon J in Baiada, above n 1, at [65]; and see also [70]. 
83 Pilbara Infrastructure, above n 15, at [99]), and relying on the decision of Steytler J in Hamersley 
Iron, above n 71, which was endorsed in Devcon, above n 8. See also Tobiassen above n 9 at [65]. 
84  Pilbara Infrastructure , above n 15, at [99] 
85 Ibid at [108]. 
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What should employers do? 
 
In each of the decisions in the first part of this article the issues were framed by focusing 
on an incident that had occurred and analysing who, under the circumstances, was 
responsible for the incident: that is, who should be blamed for what actually happened? 
In each decision the courts appear to make a series of moves that reduced the liability of 
the principal.  
First, the courts appear uncritically to conflate expertise required to carry out the work 
with expertise required to ensure WHS. The assumption appears to be that if an 
employer does not have the expertise to carry out the work, it does not have the 
expertise to ensure that the work is performed safely and without risks to health by a 
contractor. Equally the courts appear to assume that an independent contractor who has 
expertise to carry out particular work will also have expertise in performing that work 
safely and without risks to health. 
Second, the courts seem to consider it unduly burdensome for an employer to seek out 
knowledge and to develop expertise so as at least to know enough about the task 
undertaken by the expert contractor to ensure the development of a safe system and 
methods for performing that expert work, and to supervise the WHS aspects of that 
work.  
Third, the courts do not distinguish two kinds of expert contractor situations:  
(a) where the principal and the contractor work in the same industry, but the 
contractor has specialist knowledge or expertise that the principal does not have – 
for example, where the principal is a construction company and the expert 
contractor has particular expertise in a specialist process (for example, tilt-up 
construction); and 
(b) where the principal and the expert contractor work in completely different 
industries, and the principal engages the contractor to perform a ‘one off’ task – 
for example, the principal is a prospecting company and engages the contractor to 
construct a donga in a remote location. 
Fourth, the courts appear not to distinguish between situations in which the principal or 
client engages the expert contractor to perform work that is clearly isolated and 
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quarantined from other activities (for example, the situation posed by Heydon J in Baiada 
where a householder engages an electrician to carry out specialist work),86 as distinct 
from a principal engaging a contractor to carry out work in the course of conducting its 
business, and where there may be a number of interdependent actors – for example, the 
work of the chicken handling and transporting contractors in Baiada, or the work of the 
specialist tilt-up and building supervision contractors in Devcon and Tobiassen.  
A situation where a householder who knows nothing about electrical work engages an 
expert electrician to perform a discrete task has very little in common with a situation 
where a chicken processing firm regularly engages a series of contractors to carry out 
work which is part and parcel of the chicken processing firm’s business, with which the 
firm is familiar, and which requires co-ordination between the contractors to ensure that 
the work is carried out safely. In the first scenario, as Heydon J in the Baiada case 
observed, the electrician would justifiably be annoyed if the householder sought to 
oversee the work.87 In the second scenario, the principal understands the operation, and 
is in a position to require the contractors to co-ordinate their operations and to co-
operate to ensure that they are carried out safely. 
Fifth, the courts seem to caricature the gap between the independent contractor’s 
expertise and the principal’s expertise. For example, in Baiada Baiada and the 
independent contractors both operated in the same industry as repeat players, and 
indeed, both were involved in the same work. The High Court appeared only to be 
interested in the expertise and experience of the contractors (and appeared to exaggerate 
the skills and expertise involved), and seemed to ignore that the work the contractors 
carried out was in fact work that Baiada itself carried out. In short, it was difficult to see 
how Baiada lacked expertise in the contractors’ work.  
This caricature of the difference in expertise partly arises because of the final factor: that 
the courts reached their conclusions without considering what is required to comply, on 
an ongoing basis, with the positive, proactive duties in Australian WHS law. Compliance 
with such continuing obligations requires self-regulation in organisations; that is, 
                                                 
86 Baiada, above n 2, at [65]. 
87 In any event, it is unlikely that the householder will be regarded to be an employer or self-
employed person, or a person conducting a business or undertaking and thus owing the primary 
duty in the WHS Acts: Explanatory Memorandum ─ Model Work Health and Safety Bill, Safe Work 
Australia, Canberra, 2 December 2010, pars 24 and 25; Safe Work Australia, Interpretive 
Guidelines─Model Work Health and Safety Act: The Meaning of ‘person conducting a business or 
undertaking’ (2011), 3-4. 
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accepting responsibility, building capacity and institutionalising arrangements to ensure 
compliance as an ongoing state of affairs.88 It is an approach that is compatible with and 
supported by systematic WHS management.89 
 
All conscientious employers – whether large or small – should have knowledge of the 
principles of systematic WHS management.90 What do these principles tell us about the 
way in which an employer should approach the task of ensuring that work carried out by 
expert contractors is performed, as far as is reasonably practicable, safely and without 
risks to health? A key point to note is that they require the firm to have arrangements to 
address WHS for contractors, sub-contractors, agency and other precarious workers. Liz 
Bluff91 has recently summarised the other elements – or principles and practices – as 
including: 
 management commitment and leadership in planning, resourcing, supporting and 
reviewing the implementation of WHS measures; 
 integrating WHS management into other decision-making and activities, so that 
WHS resources and processes are distributed throughout the organisation; 
 taking a planned and order-seeking approach to WHS management by 
developing and implementing programs and action plans; reviewing their 
progress and effectiveness; and allocating responsibilities to, and supporting, 
managers, supervisors and workers; 
 using experiential learning and other forms of training to build managers’, 
supervisors’ and workers’ WHS knowledge and skills appropriate to their work 
roles and responsibilities; 
                                                 
88  Johnstone and Jones, above n 3; Parker C, The Open Corporation. Effective Self-Regulation and 
Democracy, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2002, pp ix-x, 27, 43-61. 
89  This does not imply complex management systems but rather methodical and organised effort 
to manage health and safety. 
90
  Indeed, work health and safety regulators in each jurisdiction have approved codes of practice 
on WHS management: see, for example, Safe Work Australia, Model Code of Practice How to 
Manage Work Health and Safety Risks , 2011. 
91 R Johnstone, E Bluff and A Clayton, Work Health and Safety Law and Policy, 3 ed, Thompson 
Reuters, 2012, 28-31. 
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 facilitating open and constructive communication about WHS matters among 
managers, supervisors and workers, and enabling active participation by all to 
enable positive, proactive problem solving about WHS; 
 proactively managing WHS risks by identifying potential hazards; considering the 
severity and likelihood of harm from exposure to hazards; eliminating or 
minimising exposure to hazards; and continually reviewing risk control measures 
to ensure that they are implemented, effective and maintained; 
 documenting arrangements to manage WHS to ensure they are communicated to, 
and implemented by, managers, supervisors and workers; 
 monitoring and reviewing WHS management to confirm strengths, identify and 
address weaknesses, and continuously improve these arrangements; and 
 acknowledging that a wide range of contextual factors within and outside 
organisations — including organisational ‘culture’; power inequalities; business 
priorities; market pressures; and informal and formal communication and 
decision-making processes — impede or improve decision-making and action on 
WHS.   
What does this mean for employers lacking the expertise to carry out key activities as part 
of its business? These principles of systematic WHS management suggest that it is 
unlikely that it will be enough simply to engage an expert contractor, and ‘leave them to 
it.’  The employer must consider the broad WHS issues in the proposed work,92 
including whether the job requires specialist skills, expertise or resources, or a particular 
level of experience, that the employer does not have. If specialist skills, expertise, 
experience or resources are absent, the employer must ensure that one of its employees 
has, or acquires as far as is reasonably practicable, knowledge about the work process and 
how to ensure that it is conducted safely and without risks to health. Australian WHS 
regulators have produced a wide range of codes of practice and guidance material, and if 
any of these cover the work to be carried out, at least one manager or supervisor must 
know and understand the WHS principles and procedures in the document. 
                                                 
92 Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment, New Zealand, Health and Safety in 
Contracting Situations, undated, 11, 17-18. 
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If the safest way of carrying out the work requires an expert independent contractor to 
be engaged, in selecting the contractor (whether by tender or other means) the employer 
must ensure that ‘safety is as critical a factor as the contract price or duration.’93 The 
employer must ensure, in advance, that the WHS standards for the work are determined, 
develop a WHS plan for managing the project, and provide information to the contractor 
or potential contractors on the WHS issues involved in the proposed work.94 The 
employer must then exercise due diligence in assessing and appointing the contractor to 
ensure that the contractor has the required competence, expertise, resources and 
experience to carry out the particular work safely, and without risks to health. This will 
require the employer to assess contractors’ technical and WHS management 
competence.95 The contractor must provide documentation about how they will perform 
the work safely, maintain agreed standards, systems and processes established earlier in 
the contracting process, and other relevant matters.96  
The employer must discuss the arrangements for ensuring WHS with the chosen 
contractor, and provide the contractor with all known information that might be relevant 
to the hazards associated with the contract.97 It must also ensure that the contractor takes 
an effective, systematic approach to managing WHS in their work procedures. Crucially, 
the employer must require the contractor to identify the risks involved in the work the 
contractor is performing, and to specify how the risks will be controlled. Compliance 
with WHS requirements should be a pre-condition of the award of any contract.98 
The contract between the employer and the independent contractor should clearly set 
out the obligations of the contractor in WHS matters. For example, it should specify the 
contractor’s specialist area of expertise; the contractor’s responsibility to ensure WHS for 
their operations; and the reliance that the principal is placing on the contractor in WHS 
matters within that area of expertise. The arrangements for addressing the health and 
safety aspects of the work should be incorporated into the contract, including details of 
                                                 
93 Central Cranes Limited v Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment  [1997] 3 NZLR 694. 
94 Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment , above n 92,  13, 18-19. 
95 Ibid 13, 19, 29-32. For example, a pre-tender questionnaire can be used to determine how well 
contractors manage health and safety generally and for specific hazards. 
96 Ibid 14, 18-19. 
97 Ibid 14. 
98 Ibid 29. 
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lines of communication, responsibilities, accountability, safe systems of work, safe work 
method statements and so on.99 
The employer must also consider: 
o whether there are any WHS directions that are reasonably practicable for it to 
issue to contractors?; and 
o how, and to what extent, the employer can reasonably supervise, throughout the 
duration of the contract, the work, and/or monitor contractor compliance with 
the agreed standards and controls, the contractor’s WHS procedures and with 
WHS obligations. 
As far as is reasonably practicable, the employer must: 
o require reports from the contractor about incidents or any workplace changes 
that may impact upon the integrity of the contractor’s risk control measures;  
o act immediately and proactively on identified breaches, incidents or identified 
unsafe practices, taking necessary steps if the employer observes unsafe practices 
on site visits, and meeting with the contractor to resolve issues; and 
o periodically review its systematic management of WHS, including how it is 
overseeing the work of expert contractors. 
In some circumstances the best the employer can do may be to simply engage an expert 
contractor with the requisite WHS competence to do the job, and ‘leave them to it’ – 
particularly where the principal has no expertise in the activity, and the task is an isolated 
and quarantined ‘one off’ task, where there is little risk to third parties: for example, a 
householder engaging an expert electrician for a discrete task. 
But where a principal engages an expert contractor for a one off task that might affect 
the WHS of the principal’s employees or third parties, and the principal works in the 
industry, it would not be sufficient for the principal to engage the expert contractor and 
‘leave them to it’. The principal has a duty to ensure that the contractor has the requisite 
expertise and experience; to require the contractor to show how it will ensure the WHS 
                                                 
99 Ibid 14, 33-39. 
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of itself and others; and to ensure that the contractor implements its WHS 
arrangements.100 
The impact of the harmonised work health and safety statutes 
 
No doubt it will be argued that some of these proposals go beyond what the courts have 
required employers to do when engaging expert independent contractors. It is likely, 
however, that if the courts were to re-examine the issue in the context of the harmonised 
WHS Acts, and framed by the principles of effective WHS management, the courts 
might well find some or all of these proposals to be ‘reasonably practicable’. This part of 
the article examines key provisions of the harmonised WHS Acts that support this 
reading of a firm’s obligations when it engages expert independent contractors. 
 
Before examining these provisions, I note that the Workplace Relations Ministers’ 
Council (WRMC) rejected a recommendation of the National Review of Occupational Health 
and Safety Laws that might have had a significant bearing on the discharge of the PCBU’s 
duty where expert independent contractors were engaged. Some of the Australian WHS 
statutes have required duty holders to obtain competent advice in order to fulfil the 
employer’s legislative responsibilities.101  Most notably, s 22(2)(b) of the OHSA (Vic) 
requires an employer to ‘employ or engage persons who are suitably qualified in relation 
to occupational health and safety to provide advice to the employer concerning the 
health and safety of employees at the workplace’. Part 8 of the Workplace Health and 
Safety Act 1995 (Qld) made provision for WHS officers (WHSOs) with a WHS advisory 
role in medium sized and larger organisations (30 or more employees). The National 
Review102 recommended that the model WHS Act should include an equivalent of this 
Victorian provision, and for the appointment of WHSOs. Rather surprisingly, this 
recommendation was one of the very few rejected by the WRMC,103 on the rather 
spurious ground (see the discussion of the non-delegability of duties above, and the 
principles in the WHS Acts below) that ‘an unintended consequence could be that 
                                                 
100 See Model Code of Practice How to Manage Work Health and Safety Risks, above n 89, at p 6. 
101 Eg, reg 16 of the Occupational Health and Safety Regulation 2001 (NSW). The Occupational 
Health, Safety and Welfare Act 1986 (SA) and the Workplace Health and Safety Act 1995 (Tas) 
required employers to appoint ‘responsible officers’. 
102 National Review into Model Occupational Health and Safety Laws Second Report to the Workplace 
Relations Minister’s Council January 2009, Australian Government,  2009, ch 32, rec 139. 
103 Workplace Relations Ministers’ Council, WRMC Response to Recommendations of the National 
Review into Model OHS Laws, 2009, p 37. 
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persons conducting a business or undertaking would be encouraged to delegate their 
responsibilities’.   
 
There are four key provisions of the harmonised WHS Acts that support the approach to 
managing the WHS of expert independent contractors outlined in the previous section: 
the primary duty of care; the key underpinning principles; the positive and proactive 
officer’s duty; and the horizontal duty of consultation, co-operation and co-ordination. 
 
 
(a) The primary duty in section 19  
The primary duty of care in the harmonised WHS Acts is important because it differs 
significantly from the approach taken to the employer’s general duty in the OHSA(Vic) 
and OSHA(WA) discussed earlier in this article. It recasts the duty as being owed by ‘a 
person conducting a business or undertaking’ (PCBU), rather than an employer, and 
owed to all kinds of ‘workers’, including contractors and sub-contractors. A PCBU is ‘a 
broad concept used to capture all types of modern working arrangements.’104 The phrase 
‘business or undertaking’ is ‘intended to be read broadly and covers businesses and 
undertakings conducted by persons including employers, principal contractors, head 
contractors, franchisors and the Crown,’105 as well as self-employed persons.106 The courts 
in the past have taken a broad approach to interpreting an ‘undertaking’107 and more than 
one person may be conducting an undertaking in any one situation.108 
Section 19(1) provides that the PCBU must, as far as is reasonably practicable ensure the 
WHS of all workers engaged or caused to be engaged, or whose activities are influenced 
or directed, by the PCBU. A ‘worker’ is defined very broadly in s 7 to be a person 
carrying out ‘work in any capacity’ for a PCBU, ‘including work as ... (b) a contractor or 
sub-contractor; (c) an employee of a contractor or sub-contractor. …’ 
 
                                                 
104 Safe Work Australia, Interpretative Guidelines─Model Work Health and Safety Act: The Meaning of ‘person 
conducting a business or undertaking’, Safe Work Australia, Canberra, 2011. 
105  Ibid, para 23. 
106  WHS Acts s 19(5) and note. 
107 See Whittaker v Delmina Pty Ltd (1998) 87 IR 268; Inspector Alwyn Piggott v CSR Emoleum Services 
Pty Ltd [2003] NSWIRComm 282 at para [226]; Octel, above n 5.  
108 See WorkCover Authority of New South Wales v Techniskill-Namutoni Pty Ltd [1995] NSWIRComm 
127 at [8]; R v Mara [1987] 1 WLR 87. 
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Section 19(2) further provides that the PCBU’s duty is also owed, so far as is reasonably 
practicable, to all ‘others’ (that is, persons who are not ‘workers’ engaged etc by the 
PCBU) ‘put at risk’ from work carried out as part of the PCBU’s business or 
undertaking. 
 
The definition of ‘reasonably practicable’ in s 18 strongly resembles the definition of 
‘reasonably practicable’ in s 20(2) of the OHSA(Vic), except that it  
 explicitly requires ‘all relevant matters’, including the listed matters, to be 
‘weighed up’;   
 quarantines ‘cost’ by requiring the duty holder first to consider the extent of the 
risk and the available ways of controlling the risk before considering cost, and  
 specifies that a measure is only not reasonably practicable if the ‘cost is grossly 
disproportionate to the risk’. 
An important point is that, because s 19 recasts the employer’s general duty to employees 
as a duty owed by a PCBU to all workers engaged, directed, or influenced by it, there is 
reduced scope to conceive of contractors as ‘external’ to the business or undertaking, and 
and a clearer basis for arguing that all contractors should be properly supervised by the 
PCBU. 
Although the WHS Acts do not expressly require a PCBU to take a systematic approach 
to managing WHS, the courts have in the past interpreted the general duties as requiring 
a risk management approach.109 Clearly in determining what is ‘reasonably practicable’ a 
PCBU must follow a process that strongly resembles the risk management process.110 
Further, sub-s 19(3)(a)-(g) of the WHS Acts encompass some of the elements of an 
effective and systematic approach to managing WHS, although they clearly do not 
constitute a comprehensive approach. Thus ss 19(1), 19(2) and 19(3)(a)-(e) envisage the 
proactive management of WHS risks; and the PCBU’s duty in s 19(3)(f) to provide 
information, training, instruction or supervision is concerned with building knowledge 
and skills. The PCBU also has obligations, separate from the primary duty, to ensure 
worker consultation and participation in Part 5 of the Acts.111 
                                                 
109 See, for example, WorkCover Authority of NSW (Inspector Egan) v Atco Controls Pty Ltd (1998) 82 
IR 80 at 85. For further examples, see E Bluff and R Johnstone, ‘The Relationship Between 
“Reasonably Practicable” and Risk Management Regulation’ (2005) 18 AJLL 197, 212-219. 
110 See Bluff and Johnstone, Ibid. 
111  See Johnstone, Bluff and Clayton (2012) above 91 at 312-3. 
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Crucially, the primary duty provisions clearly see an independent contractor as part of the 
PCBU’s business as a ‘worker’, and there is no need for the ‘deemed employee’ 
provisions found in both the OHSA (Vic) and the OSHA (WA). These deeming 
provisions require the court to consider whether the employer or principal had ‘control’ 
of the work of the independent contractor, and this focus on ‘control’ in determining 
whether Tobiassen, Kelsh and Azzapardi were ‘employees’ preoccupied the courts in 
Devcon, Tobiassen and in Baiada, and might well have influenced their reasoning about the 
‘reasonable practicability’ of the employer or principal managing the WHS of the 
independent contractor. 
 
(b) Principles in WHSAs (Pt 2, Div 1, subdiv 1) 
 
The harmonised WHS Acts contain a series of ‘principles’ that apply to all the duties in 
the WHS Acts, including the primary duty in s 19. These ‘principles’ codify and reinforce 
principles that were developed by the courts in cases involved the pre-harmonisation 
statutes.112 Where there are multiple primary duty holders, s 14 of the WHS Acts specifies 
that ‘a duty cannot be transferred to another person’. This is reinforced by s 272 which 
renders void ‘a term of any agreement or contract’ to the extent that it ‘purports to 
exclude, limit or modify the operation’ of the Act or any duty owed under the Act or ‘to 
transfer to another person any duty owed’ under the Act. In short, ss 14 and 272 codify 
and emphasise the non-delegability or transferability of the duties in the Acts. 
 
The WHS Acts also clarify that a person can have more than one duty by virtue of being 
in more than one class of duty holder.113 More than one person can concurrently have the 
same duty and in those instances each person must fully discharge the duty to the extent 
to which the person has the capacity to influence and control114 the matter or would have 
had that capacity but for an agreement or arrangement purporting to limit or remove that 
capacity.115  
 
(c) The Officers’ duty 
 
                                                 
112   See further R Johnstone, Occupational Health and Safety Law and Policy, 2 ed, Thompson Law 
Book, Sydney, 2004, 232-3 and 301-2. 
113 S 15. 
114 See Explanatory Memorandum, above n 87, [66]. 
115 Ss 16(1)-(3). 
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Another provision in the WHS Acts that is significantly different from the provisions in 
the pre-harmonised statutes is the officer’s duty in s 27. While the pre-harmonised Acts 
that did contain officer’s duties generally included ‘accessorial’ duties (outlining 
circumstances in which an officer could also be liable for an offence committed by the 
corporation) or imputed duties (where the officer would also be liable for the offence 
unless the officer could satisfy specified defences), s 27(1) provides that an officer ‘must 
exercise due diligence to ensure’ that the PCBU’ complies with’ a duty or obligation that 
the PCBU has under the Act. Sub-s 27(4) provides that an officer may be convicted or 
found guilty of a s 27(1) offence whether or not the PCBU ‘has been convicted or found 
guilty of an offence under this Act….’  
 
In other words, the duty is positive and proactive in that all officers must exercise due 
diligence to ensure that the PCBU complies with its duties, and if any officer does not 
exercise due diligence, he or she breaches s 27(1), even if other officers have exercised 
due diligence and even if the PCBU complies with all of its duties. Because the duty is a 
positive and proactive duty, inspectors can enforce the duty by issuing improvement 
notices or infringement notices. Exercising due diligence is also compatible with a 
systematic approach to WHS management. 
Section 27(5) provides that ‘due diligence includes taking reasonable steps: 
 (a) to acquire and keep up-to-date knowledge of work health and safety matters; and 
 (b) to gain an understanding of the nature of the operations of the business or 
undertaking of the [PCBU] and generally of the hazards and risks associated with 
those operations; and 
 (c) to ensure that the [PCBU] has available for use, and uses, appropriate resources 
and processes to eliminate or minimise risks to health and safety from work carried 
out as part of the conduct of the business or undertaking; and 
 (d) to ensure that the [PCBU] has appropriate processes for receiving and considering 
information regarding incidents, hazards and risks and responding in a timely way 
to that information; and 
 (e) to ensure that the [PCBU] has, and implements, processes for complying with any 
duty or obligation of the [PCBU] under this Act; and 
… 
 (f) to verify the provision and use of the resources and processes referred to in 
paragraphs (c) to (e). 
What are ‘reasonable steps’, and do they require the officer to seek knowledge of or get 
advice about the operation of the business, the WHS hazards and the methods to 
remove or minimise the risks posed by those hazards? Middleton J in Australian Securities 
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and Investments Commission v Healey and others (Healey)116 recently examined the meaning of 
‘reasonable steps’ in a case about a failure by directors to secure a company’s compliance 
with its accounting records obligations as required by the Corporations Act 2001. 
Middleton J made it clear that the officer is part of the mechanisms and procedures by 
which the firm complies with its obligations,117 and cannot ‘simply put the discharge of 
those functions in the hands of apparently competent and reliable persons’.118 The 
standard of ‘all reasonable steps’ is ‘determined objectively by reference to the particular 
circumstances of the case’.119  Middleton J confirmed that an officer does not have to do 
everything him- or herself, and may rely on information and specialist advice from 
others,120 and on the expertise of others — but emphasised that reliance without 
exercising independent judgment is not enough to satisfy the duty. Officers ‘are required 
to take reasonable steps to place themselves in a position to guide and monitor the 
management of the company.’121 In the WHS Acts, this is made clear by the detail of s 
27(5).  
In short, an officer can only argue that reliance on advice or information from others 
represents ‘reasonable steps’ if: 
 the officer is satisfied of the competence of the person on whom they rely; and 
 the officer is aware that there are processes in place to ensure that the 
information or advice of the person on whom the reliance is made is properly 
informed; and 
 the information or advice is read and considered by the officer, rather than 
simply relying on the conclusions or recommendations. 
Assuming that the courts will take the same approach with s 27 of the WHS Acts, it is 
clear that the officers of a PCBU cannot simply passively ‘rely on’ the expertise of an 
independent contractor, but must ‘at a minimum, … take a diligent and intelligent 
interest in the information either available to them or which they might appropriately 
demand from the executives or other employees and agents of the company’122 in 
addressing each of the elements of ‘due diligence’ in s 27(5).  
                                                 
116 [2011] FCA 717. 
117 Healey, above n 116, at [141]-[142]. 
118 Ibid at [142]. 
119 Ibid at [143], and see [162]. 
120 Ibid at [143]. 
121 Ibid at [166]. 
122 Ibid at [162]. See also [203]. 
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(d) Duty of horizontal consultation, co-operation and co-ordination (s 46) 
 
 
The WHS Acts impose an obligation on all duty holders to consult, co-operate and 
coordinate their activities to ensure WHS. Section 46 provides that  
 
If more than one person has a duty in respect of the same matter under this Act, each 
person with the duty must, so far as is reasonably practicable, consult, co-operate and co-
ordinate activities with all other persons who have a duty in relation to the same matter.  
 
The Model Code of Practice: Work Health and Safety Consultation, Co-operation and Co-
ordination explains that the duty is important because it helps ‘address any gaps in 
managing health and safety risks’ that may arise ‘when there is a lack of understanding of 
how the activities of each person may add to the hazards and risks’ to others; ‘duty 
holders assume that someone else is taking care of the health and safety matter’; and/or 
‘the person who takes action is not the best person to do so.’123  
What does this duty entail? What is reasonably practicable to do to consult, co-operate 
and coordinate activities with other duty holders ‘will depend on the circumstances, 
including the nature of the work and the extent of interaction’. 124 The first step is for all 
duty holders to identify, from the start of the project — for example, during the planning 
of work125 — who the other duty holders are that they need to consult, co-operate and 
co-ordinate activities with’,126 and then commence consultation, co-operation and co-
ordinating activities with those duty holders.127  
The objective of consultation is to make sure everyone associated with the work has a 
shared understanding of what the risks are, which workers are affected and how the risks 
will be controlled. …. This consultation will determine which health and safety duties are 
shared and what each person needs to do to co-operate and co-ordinate activities with 
each other to comply with their health and safety duty.128  
Co-operation and co-ordination with other duty holders ‘should be an ongoing process’ 
throughout the time duty holders ‘are involved in the same work and share the same 
                                                 
123 Safe Work Australia,  Model Code of Practice: Work Health and Safety Consultation, Co-operation 
and Co-ordination, 2011, at p 4. 
124 Ibid 17 
125 Ibid 19. 
126 Ibid 18. 
127 Ibid 18. 
128 Ibid 19. 
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duty.’ 129 Depending on the circumstances, duty holders can control risks not necessarily 
by taking action themselves, ‘but making sure that another person is doing so.’130 
 
In conclusion, the s 46 obligation strongly suggests that simply relying on an expert 
contractor is not sufficient to discharge the PCBU’s duty. At the minimum, there needs 
to be ongoing consultation, co-operation and co-ordination, and the PCBU has to ensure 
that the contractor is taking the necessary control measures.  
  
Conclusion 
This article has examined the rather vexed issue of what is, and should be, required of a 
firm that engages an expert independent contractor to carry out activities that the firm 
itself cannot perform because of lack of in-house expertise. If the courts are going to 
take the approach applied in the Western Australian cases discussed in this article, then 
the non-transferability of the general duties will be significantly undermined, particularly 
if the courts exaggerate the expertise of the contractor, and overstate the ignorance of 
the firm. 
The article does not challenge the proposition that engaging an expert independent 
contractor may well be the safest way of carrying out an activity. Rather it argues that the 
issue is the extent to which the firm has responsibility to manage and supervise the 
activities of the independent contractor in order to ensure that the work is done as safely 
and without risks to health as is reasonably practicable in the circumstances. 
The article argues that the Western Australian Supreme Court in four of the cases 
analysed – Devcon, Tobiassen, Laing O’Rourke, and Pilbara Infrastructure – too readily 
accepted that an employer can discharge its general duty by engaging an independent 
contractor, without any further supervisory responsibilities. This view was apparently 
endorsed by the High Court in Baiada, although only expressly in the judgment of 
Heydon J, which itself was obiter on this point. 
The article argues that the approach of the Western Australian cases encourages a firm to 
maintain their ignorance of the health and safety issues arising from activities outsourced 
to expert independent contractors, rather than requiring the firm to understand the 
process as much as is reasonably practicable, and to integrate the independent contractor 
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and its activities into the firm’s systematic management of WHS. It would be difficult for 
any PCBU nowadays to argue that it should not have knowledge of the requirements of 
systematic WHS management. At the very least, a small firm engaging an independent 
contractor can require the contractor to explain its approach managing health and safety 
in the activity, and report to the firm on progress, and on incidents.  
The article concludes by arguing that certain provisions of the harmonised WHS Acts – 
particularly the positive and proactive officer’s duty, coupled with the PCBU duty and 
the obligation to consult, co-operate and co-ordinate – support this call for a broader 
obligation on the firm to manage the health and safety of activities carried out by expert 
independent contractors. Indeed, the responsibilities of a duty holder are well 
summarised by the Model Code of Practice How to Manage Work Health and Safety Risks 
Never assume that someone else is taking care of a health and safety matter. Find 
out who is doing what and work together with the other duty holder in a co-
operative and co-ordinated way so that all risks are eliminated or minimised so 
far as is reasonably practicable. 
When entering into contracts you should communicate your safety requirements 
and policies, review the job to be undertaken, discuss any safety issues that may 
arise and how they will be dealt with. Remember that you cannot transfer your 
responsibilities to another person.131  
This requires a PCBU to do more than simply engage an expert contractor and ‘leave it 
to them.’ Effective health and safety management demands that the courts require firms 
to acquire as much knowledge as is reasonably practicable about work that is undertaken 
by an expert independent contractor. Firms should, at the very least, meta-regulate the 
health and safety performance of the independent contractor, by requiring the contractor 
to explain how it will ensure that the work is done safely, and to report regularly on how 
it is implementing its proposed health and safety plans and processes. 
In conclusion, there is an urgent need for a new code of practice to address this issue of 
the firm’s WHS duties when an expert independent contractor is engaged. The code 
should ensure that PCBUs: 
o take a systematic approach to WHS management of all aspects of the business or 
undertaking; 
                                                 
131  Model Code of Practice How to Manage Work Health and Safety Risks, above n 90, at p 6. 
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o do not allow WHS management to be fragmented when contractors are engaged; 
and 
o know how to manage contractors with technical expertise that the PCBU does 
not have. 
 
 
